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Abstract—In wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes eventually 
die due to battery depletion. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
in which new nodes are periodically redeployed with certain 
intervals, called generations, to replace the dead nodes are called 
multi-phase wireless sensor networks. In the literature, there are 
several key predistribution schemes proposed for secure 
operation of WSNs. However, these schemes are designed for 
single phase networks which are not resilient against continuous 
node capture attacks; even under temporary attacks on the 
network, the harm caused by the attacker does not heal in time. 
However, the periodic deployments in multi-phase sensor 
networks could be utilized to improve the resiliency of the WSNs 
by deploying nodes with fresh keys. In the literature, there is 
limited work done in this area. In this paper, we propose a key 
predistribution scheme for multi-phase wireless sensor networks 
which is highly resilient under node capture attacks. In our 
scheme, called RGM (Random Generation Material) key 
predistribution scheme, each generation of deployment has its 
own random keying material and pairwise keys are established 
between node pairs of particular generations. These keys are 
specific to these generations. Therefore, a captured node cannot 
be abused to obtain keys of other generations. We compare the 
performance of our RGM scheme with a well-known multi-phase 
key predistribution scheme and showed that RGM achieves up to 
three-fold more resiliency. Even under heavy attacks, our 
scheme's resiliency performance is 50% better in steady state.  
Keywords—Multi-phase wireless sensor networks, security, key 
predistribution, generation keys. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are composed of small 
devices called sensor nodes. Wireless sensor networks are 
well-suited for wide spectrum of purposes such as 
environment security, military tracking, medical and scientific 
experiments. Sensor nodes are powered via irreplaceable 
batteries; therefore, a particular sensor node can function as 
long as its battery is alive. However, WSNs should function 
for longer period of time compared to the lifetime of a sensor 
node. Therefore, as the nodes die, new nodes should be 
deployed in certain intervals, called generations, during 
operation of the network. This kind of WSNs is called multi-
phase wireless sensor networks. 
When sensor networks are deployed in critical 
environments, security becomes an important concern. In case 
of an existence of an attacker, sensor nodes can be captured 
and their keys can be obtained for message eavesdropping and 
injection purposes. 
In wireless sensor network, security solutions based on 
CPU-efficient symmetric key cryptography are preferred. 
Moreover, in-network processing necessities require the 
symmetric keys to be distributed in node-to-node (i.e. link) 
basis.  
In the literature, the problem of key distribution in WSNs 
is addressed by several probabilistic key predistribution 
schemes such as [3,5,6,7]. One of the first key management 
schemes using this approach is Eschenauer and Gligor’s basic 
scheme [3]. Basic scheme is composed of three phases: key 
predistribution, shared key discovery, and path-key 
establishment phases. In key predistribution, for each sensor 
node τ keys are randomly drawn from a key pool of size P 
where P<<τ . Those τ keys form keyring in a node. Since all 
keys are drawn from the same pool, any two sensor nodes may 
keep a shared key with a probability less than 1. Shared key 
discovery phase starts after all sensor nodes are deployed and 
they discover neighbor nodes in their communication range. In 
this phase, all the nodes try to find a key shared between their 
neighbors. If there is such a key, it is used to secure 
communication between those two; otherwise, they run path-
key establishment phase in which common secure neighbors 
help in key establishment. In the basic scheme, it is likely that 
a particular key exists in several nodes' keyrings. This is 
actually a must because otherwise the probability that a 
common key is found in shared key discovery phase, called 
local connectivity, reduces. However, having multiple copies 
of a key is also a potential security problem. An attacker can 
capture some nodes and acquire their keyrings. Established 
links secured by using the same keys in acquired keyrings are 
automatically compromised by the attacker. This weakens the 
security of the network.  
Chan et al. [7] proposed another scheme to increase the 
resistance of basic scheme. Instead of using only one shared 
key, Chan et al. offered using as two or more shared keys. In 
this way, they achieve more durable system against attacks. 
This additional feature can lower connectivity value. 
In [4], Blom proposed a multipurpose deterministic key 
pre-distribution scheme which uses single key space. Each 
node is able to calculate a pairwise key by storing 
only 1+λ keys in a network of size N ( )N<<λ . In this scheme, 
there is a property that an attacker cannot compromise any 
link unless no more than λ nodes have been captured. Besides, 
if λ nodes have been captured, whole system gets 
compromised. Du et al. [6] further improved Blom’s scheme 
and transformed it to a general probabilistic case that is 
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directly applicable to WSNs. Du et al.’s scheme uses a multi-
space approach. This scheme has similar phases with basic 
scheme. 
In all random key predistribution schemes, there is a trade-
off between local connectivity and resiliency against node 
capture attacks. Having a large keyring size increases the 
probability of direct key sharing (local connectivity), but this 
also gives more keys to the attacker when a node is captured.  
Previously discussed systems are all designed for single-
phase WSNs. Even if they allow dynamic node additions to 
the network, their key pools contain static keys that do not 
change in redeployments. As a result, if the network 
encounters a long term attack and new nodes are added to the 
system dynamically after this attack, they will be integrated to 
the network with some already compromised keys in their 
keyring. If the attacker continues his/her attack by capturing 
nodes and acquiring the keyring of captured nodes, he/she will 
eventually discover all of the key pool and the network would 
totally collapse. However, periodic redeployments in multi-
phase sensor networks present an important opportunity to 
reduce the effect of an attacker. In each redeployment, a fresh 
set of keys may be deployed. So after a temporary attack, key 
pool can recover itself and remove the effects of the 
compromised keys. In addition to that, in case of a continuous 
attack, key pool can keep the rate of damage within a certain 
level. Here, the tradeoff is again at resiliency and local 
connectivity. Moreover, the connectivity among the nodes in 
different deployment generation should also be sustained. 
There is limited work done in the literature about key 
distribution is multi-phase sensor networks. One of them, RoK 
scheme [1], is explained in the next section in detail.  
In this paper, we propose a novel random key 
predistribution scheme for multi-phase wireless sensor 
networks which is called RGM (Random Generation Material) 
scheme. In our RGM scheme, each generation of deployment 
has its own random keying material. During shared key 
discovery, unique pairwise keys are established between node 
pairs of particular generations. Here by uniqueness, we mean 
that nodes of other generation cannot know these keys. 
Therefore, a captured node cannot be used to obtain keys of 
other generations. This significantly improves the resiliency of 
RGM. We conducted simulative performance analyses and 
compared RGM scheme with RoK [1]. Our analyses show that 
RGM scheme is up to three-fold more resilient to node capture 
attacks as compared to RoK scheme. We also show that under 
heavy attacks, RoK scheme reveals 50% more secure link 
keys as compared to our RGM scheme. Moreover, our scheme 
provides 90% local connectivity, which is more than sufficient 
for a WSN.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
gives background information on key distribution in multi-
phase WSNs. The RGM scheme, our contribution, is 
explained in Section III. Section IV discusses the comparative 
performance evaluation. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. KEY DISTRIBUTION IN MULTI-PHASE WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
Sensor nodes operate using battery power that eventually 
depletes. Wireless sensor networks are set up to function for 
longer period of time as compared to the lifetime of sensor 
nodes. So, new nodes need to be deployed in some intervals to 
provide continuity of network in multi-phase sensor networks. 
These intervals are called generations. In the beginning of 
each generation, dead nodes are replaced by new nodes.  
Castelluccia and Spognardi [1] proposed a key 
management scheme called Robust Key Distribution (RoK) 
for multi-phase wireless sensor networks, in which 
predistributed keys have limited lifetimes. This is achieved by 
refreshing key pools for each generation of deployment. 
Refreshed key pools allow a network that is temporarily 
attacked to be self-healed in time. 
If key pool is refreshed with random keys in each 
deployment, attacker cannot guess the upcoming pool by 
knowing previous keys or cannot learn former pools by 
knowing current one. But in the same way, sensor nodes 
deployed at different generations cannot establish secure links. 
In order to achieve connectivity between nodes belonging to 
different generations, there should be some kind of relation 
between key pools at different generations. 
TABLE 1.  SYMBOLS USED IN ROK AND RGM 
jFKP forward key pool at generation j 
jBKP backward key pool at generation j 
j
AFKR forward keyring of node A deployed at generation j
j
ABKR backward keyring of node A deployed at generation j
g
AGKR generation keyring of node A deployed at generation g
fg
AGKR
 
generation sub-keyring of node A deployed at generation 
g containing keys used to establish link with nodes 
deployed at generation f 
j
tfk forward key with index t at generation j 
j
tbk backward with index t at generation j 
fg
tgk generation key with index t between generations f and g
ABk link key between nodes A and B 
wG Generation window
( )⋅h secure hash function
( )⋅f hash function
( )⋅H secure hash function padded with key 
m number of current generation keys in a generation keyring
n  number of future generation keys in a generation keyring 
for each next generation 
 
RoK uses two key pools: forward and backward key pools, 
FKP and BKP. In order to provide connectivity between 
different generations, FKP is updated by hashing keys of 
previous generation and BKP is updated using Lamport hash 
chain [2].  
Table 1 gives the symbols used in the explanations of RoK 
scheme. The same symbol table will be referred for the 
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explanation of our proposed RGM scheme, which will be 
given in the next section. 
{ }jPjjj fkfkfkFKP ,...,, 21=  is the forward key pool at 
generation j where P is the pool size. 
{ }112111 ,...,, ++++ = jPjjj fkfkfkFKP  is the forward key pool at 
generation 1+j where ( )jtjt fkhfk =+1 . 
{ }jPjjj bkbkbkBKP ,...,, 21=  is the backward key pool at 
generation j where P is the pool size. 
{ }112111 ,...,, ++++ = jPjjj bkbkbkBKP  is the backward key pool at 
generation 1+j where ( )1+= jtjt bkhbk . 
It is assumed that each node has an upper bound of lifetime 
and this upper-bound defines generation window, wG , which is 
a system parameter. A node may live at most as long as 
generation window. A node A deployed at generation j is 
given two keyrings, forward keyring and backward keyring. 
Forward keyring, jAFKR , consists of forward keys of 
generation j drawn randomly from forward key pool at 
generation j, jFKP . Similarly, backward keyring, jABKR , 
consists of keys of 1−+ wGj  drawn randomly from backward 
key pool at generation 1−+ wGj , 1−+ wGjBKP .  These keyrings 
are formally shown below. 
( ){ }2,...,2,1,||||| mijiidfufkFKR AjujA ===  
( ){ }2,...,2,1,|||||1 mijiidfubkBKR AGjujA w === −+  
Node A can produce a forward key fufk  where jf > and 
backward key bubk where 1−+< wGjb . Each node, deployed at 
generation j, have certain probability to share a common key 
with another node B which is deployed at generation i, where i 
is in interval ] [ww GjGj +− , . The generations between which 
two nodes can produce the same forward and backward keys 
are called overlapping generations. Let’s suppose ji ≤ , then 
their  overlapping generations would be between j and 
1−+ wGi .If nodes A and B have common keys of indices 
zttt ,...,, 21 , they compute their link key as the following: 
( )111 ||||...||||||||
2211
−+−+−+
=
w
zz
ww Gi
t
j
t
Gi
t
j
t
Gi
t
j
tAB bkfkbkfkbkfkhk  , where ji ≤  
Forward keys provide forward secrecy since the attacker 
cannot learn previous keys even if it learns a forward key at a 
generation. Similarly, backward keys provide backward 
secrecy since the attacker cannot learn future keys even if it 
learns a backward key at a generation. When an attacker learns 
some forward and backward keys by capturing a sensor node, 
previous forward key are not revealed since a forward key is 
calculated from previous forward key by a one-way function. 
Similarly, future backward keys are also protected. Similarly 
regular sensor nodes cannot find out these previous forward 
keys and future backward keys even if they keep keys of same 
index in their keyrings. This property provides a lifetime to the 
keyring. The lifetime of a keyring also limits the capability of 
an attacker. He/she can use a compromised keyring for a short 
period of time. Since the keyrings have limited lifetime and 
key pools are refreshed periodically, compromised keys expire 
like all the other keys as time passes. In this way, network 
gradually removes the traces of an attack and heals itself. If 
this attack is a temporary type, in a certain time network 
comes to the state before the attack has started. if it is a 
permanent type of attack, network can keep the ratio of 
corrupted links within a certain limit. 
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION 
In this section, the proposed RGM (Random Generation 
Material) key predistribution scheme for multi-phase WSNs is 
designed. 
A. Overview 
In our RGM method, the concept of overlapping 
generations is not used. Instead of forward and backward 
keyrings, one keyring, called the generation keyring, is used. 
In contrast to RoK, generation keys are generated randomly by 
a distribution center at each generation. Generation keys 
evolve in a different way, independent of evolution of 
generation key pool. This will be discussed in detail below. 
Nodes will be loaded with randomly selected m generation 
keys prior to deployment in order to establish secure 
communication with other nodes in same generation. Keys in 
generation keyring are loaded to be used generation-wise.  
In our scheme, generation key pool randomly refreshes in 
time.  Therefore, there is no relation between past and future 
states of the pool in our scheme. This property is very 
important in order to limit attacker’s capability. On the other 
hand, we need to provide connectivity between nodes 
deployed at different generations. Connectivity will be 
obtained by evolving not the generation key pool itself, but 
evolving generation keys individually. 
Another improvement of our method is that generation 
keys are distributed to be used generation-wise. This has an 
advantage over RoK [1] in restricting the information an 
attacker acquires if he/she captures a node. In such a case, 
he/she can compromise the generation keys used between 
generation at which captured node has been deployed and 
other generations within the generation window. However, if 
the attacker captures a node at generation j, the nodes of other 
generations do not get affected even if j is between their 
deployment generations. Hence if the attacker wants to 
compromise a predefined link indirectly, he/she must 
compromise nodes which have generation keys in their 
keyring with the same shared indices and have been deployed 
at the same generations with one of the ends of that predefined 
link. What our method tries to do is to increase the number of 
constraints that an attacker should obey. In this way, we 
improve the resiliency of the WSN. 
B. Predistribution of Generation Material 
In multi-phase WSNs, each node should be able to 
establish secure links with its neighbor nodes in all 
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generations inside its generation window. In RGM, nodes use 
generation-wise keys to produce link keys. That is why they 
should be able to access generation-wise keying material of 
those generations. If a node stores this information for all 
generations in its generation window, it brings extra burden to 
the memory capacity of sensor nodes. Fortunately in RGM, a 
particular node A only needs to store generation keys to be 
used in establishing links with nodes deployed at future 
generations and current generation key which is used to 
establish links between node A, and other nodes deployed at 
the same generation. Node A can produce past generation keys 
(generation keys to be used in establishing links between node 
A and other nodes deployed at previous generations) by itself, 
when needed.  
A node can simply generate past generation keys by 
concatenating current generation key to a well known plain 
text such as all zeros and apply a secure hashing algorithm like 
SHA-1 or SHA-256 depending on the key size. This is the case 
just for producing the closest past generation key. The past 
generation keys after the first past generation key are 
calculated by concatenating current generation key to previous 
past generation key and applying secure hashing algorithm to 
this input. The reason behind always concatenating current 
generation key before applying secure hashing algorithm is to 
make it very hard to calculate the next past generation key if 
current generation key is not known. While current generation 
keys of various indices belonging to generation, let’s say, g, is 
known by only sensor nodes deployed at generation g again, 
past generation keys of generation g can be calculated by none 
of the sensor nodes, but nodes deployed at generation g. Past 
generation keys of generation g which are used to establish 
secure links between nodes deployed at generations g and 
1−g , and g and 2−g  are calculated as follows. 
( )ggvggv gkHgk ||0...00)1( =−  
( )ggvggvggv gkgkHgk ||)1()2( −− =  
In general, past generation key of generation g which are 
used to establish secure links between nodes deployed at 
generations g and ig −  are calculated as follows. 
( )ggvggviggviggv gkgkgkHgk |||||| )1()1()( −+−− = "  
Generation keyring of a sensor node A deployed at 
generation j, is split into sub-divisions. One of the sub-
divisions is reserved for current generation keys as shown 
below. 
( ){ }mijjiidfugkGKR AjjujjA ,...,2,1,||||||| ===  
Other sub-divisions containing random generation keys 
used to establish secure links with future generations are 
explained below. Generation keyring sub-division containing 
random keys used to secure communication with nodes 
deployed at next generation is given as follows for node A 
deployed at generation j. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }nijjiidfugkGKR AjjujjA ,...,2,1,1|||||||11 =+== ++  
The keyring for secure communication with nodes 
deployed at second next generation is as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }nijjiidfugkGKR AjjujjA ,...,2,1,2|||||||22 =+== ++  
Continuing in this manner, the keyring for secure 
communication with nodes deployed at 1−wG
st next 
generation is given as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }niGjjiidfugkGKR wAGjjuGjjA ww ,...,2,1,1|||||||11 =−+== −+−+  
To sum up, generation keyring of a sensor node A 
deployed at generation j is as follows. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
−+−+−+−+
++++
++++
−
−−−−
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In RGM, sensor nodes store m current generation keys and 
n future generation keys for each upcoming generation. 
Because a sensor node may communicate with at most 1−wG
st 
next generation, the total amount of generation keys in a 
keyring is ( ) mnGw +− *1 . 
C. Calculation of Link Keys 
Suppose nodes A and B are deployed at generations f and g 
respectively, where gf < . Past generation key fgvgk with 
index v, which is used to secure communication between A 
and B, can be computed if and only if a node has current 
generation key ggvgk with index v belonging to its own 
generation. As a result, a sensor node, which is deployed at 
generation e where gef << , cannot compute generation key 
fg
vgk  even if it has generation key egvgk with index v.  
It is clear that a generation key fgvgk with index v may be 
known only by nodes of generations f and g. No such node 
deployed at another generation can compute the key that is 
unique to generation f and g. So an attacker has to waste extra 
effort and compromise the nodes belonging to generations f or 
g if she wants to acquire the link key between nodes A and B. 
In our RGM scheme, as in RoK scheme, all the shared 
generation keys contribute to the link key. Contribution of as 
many keys as possible increases the resistance of link against 
attacks. Let’s suppose, node A deployed at generation f and 
another node B deployed at generation g have common 
generation keys with indices zvvv ,...,, 21 . They compute their 
link key as follows: 
( )fgvfgvfgvAB zgkgkgkhk ||...|||| 21=  where gf < . 
Node B can produce generation keys used generation-wise 
between generations f and g from current generation key 
gg
tgk using the mechanism explained in the previous 
subsection. On the other hand, node A cannot produce 
generation keys, so those generation keys are preloaded to A 
before deployment again as explained in previous subsection. 
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IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We performed various simulations to compare the 
performances of RoK [1] and the proposed RGM methods. In 
the simulations key pool size is set to 10000 keys, and 
memory size is set to 1100 keys for RGM and 500 keys for 
RoK scheme. The reason of using less keys for RoK is that 
RoK reaches almost 1.0 local connectivity when 500 keys are 
utilized. Using more keys does not further improve the 
performance of RoK; on the contrary, using more keys 
reduces the resiliency since in case of a node capture attacker 
unnecessarily learns more keys.  
RoK utilizes memory by dedicating half of the memory to 
forward keyring, and the other half to backward keyring. In 
our simulations, each keyring has 250 keys. RGM scheme has 
different m and n values for current generation sub-keyring 
and future generation sub-keyrings. For a memory size of 
1100 keys, m value is set to 200 and n value is set to 100. 
There are 1−wG  future generation sub-keyrings and 100 
future generation keys are predistributed for each upcoming 
generation.  
In our simulations, as in [1], sensor network is composed 
of a square grid of sensors, each node having exactly 4 
neighbors. There are 400 sensor nodes on this square grid. 
Generation window ( wG ) is set to 10. Sensor nodes have a 
random lifetime assigned according to Gaussian distribution 
with mean 2wG , and standard deviation 6wG . As in [1], dead 
nodes are replaced with new nodes immediately in the 
beginning of each generation. Simulations are run along 50 
generations. All simulations are run 25 times and their average 
values are shown in the figures. 
Our attack model assumes an attacker who can randomly 
capture nodes at random locations. In the simulations, the 
attacker's capture rate is taken as 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round. 
In our scheme, round is the time unit and one generation 
consists of 10 rounds. 
 
Figure 1.  Active 1-resiliency of RoK and RGM in case of an eager attacker 
with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 nodes per round 
Figures 1 and 2 show 1-resiliency of the sensor network 
against an eager attacker. 1-resiliency is defined as the fraction 
of indirectly compromised links. That is, if this ratio is low, 
the network is more resilient. Indirectly compromised link is a 
link whose keys are known by the attacker, but none of the 
sensors in both ends is compromised. Eager attacker identifies 
an attacker who starts his/her activity from the beginning of 
network to the end. Active resiliency is the resiliency due to 
current alive links. A link is said to be alive if both ends are 
alive. In other words active 1-resiliency is defined as the ratio 
of compromised alive links to all established alive links. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, active 1-resiliency reaches 
its highest value in around generation 5, when most of nodes 
deployed at the initial phase are alive. After this time on, first 
nodes start to die, and resiliency stabilizes together with 
arrival of new nodes. Our results show that in the steady state 
our RGM scheme performs 35% - 50% better than RoK 
scheme at capture rates of 3 and 5 nodes per round. At capture 
rate of 1 node per round, in the steady state both schemes 
perform equally.  
 
Figure 2.  Total resiliency of RoK and RGM in case of an eager attacker with 
capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round 
Figure 2 shows total 1-resiliency values of RoK and our 
RGM schemes. Total 1-resiliency is the ratio of the all 
indirectly compromised dead or alive links over all established 
links since the beginning of the network. Total 1-resiliency is 
important if the attacker keeps log of communications in the 
network. When a link is compromised even if its endpoints are 
dead, an attacker may have a look at the logged messages and 
learn the contents. Of course, the content of the message may 
not be as valuable as when it was sent. As can be seen from 
Figure 2, in steady-state (i.e. after around 10th generation) 
RGM performs better than RoK in all capture rates. In RoK, 
the 1-resiliency values tend converges to around 0.6 in all 
capture rates, meaning that 60% of the links are compromised. 
However, in our RGM scheme, even if the network is attacked 
with the highest rate of 5 nodes per round, the 1-resiliency 
value barely reaches 0.5. For lower capture rates, performance 
improvement of RGM over RoK is clearer. When the capture 
rate is 1 node per round, at the end of the simulations the 
number of links that the attacker captures is approximately 
three-fold more in RoK scheme as compared to our RGM.  
Figure 3 comparatively shows 1-resiliency of RoK and 
RGM in case of a temporary attacker who starts his/her 
activity in generation 5 and ends in generation 14. When the 
attack starts, ratio of compromised links raises up to an upper-
bound which is different for all corruption rates and after 
attack stops, network starts to heal itself As can be seen from 
Figure 3, both schemes completely heals (i.e. ratio of 
compromised links come to zero) almost at the same time 
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(generation 22). Figure 3 also shows that during the attack, 
RGM performs as much as 35% better than RoK for capture 
rates of 3 and 5 nodes per round.  
 
Figure 3.  Active resiliency of RoK and RGM in case of a temporary attacker 
with capture rates of 1, 3, and 5 per round 
One drawback of RGM scheme is that local connectivity of 
RGM tends to be less than in RoK. Local connectivity is 
defined as the probability of any two neighbors to share at 
least one common key. The local connectivity values of RoK 
and RGM for the cases that we analyze are given in Figure 4. 
As can be seen from this figure, in RGM neighboring nodes 
share at least one key with a probability of around 0.9, while 
in RoK this value is 1.0. That means our scheme performs 
10% worse than RoK. However, this does not mean that 10% 
of the nodes are completely disjointed from the network. 0.9 
local connectivity means 10% of all possible links are 
insecure. However, the end points of these insecure links have 
at least one other secure neighbor and via these secure 
neighbors they are connected to the network securely. That is 
why 90% local connectivity, as in RGM scheme, is considered 
more than enough for the secure operation of the network.   
 
Figure 4.  Local connectivity of RoK and RGM 
Another relative drawback of RGM scheme is its higher 
memory requirements as compared to RoK scheme. However, 
as analyzed below, the amount of key memory that RGM uses 
covers only a small portion of the data memory of the state-of-
the-art sensor nodes. The simulations results reported in this 
section require 1100 keys per node for RGM and 500 keys per 
node for RoK. Assuming that 128-bit keys are used and 
another 16 bits are employed for key identification, the 
amount of memory used for RGM and RoK are 19800 and 
9000 bytes, respectively. In parallel with latest advances in 
sensor node technology, storage capabilities are increased. For 
example, MICAz and IRIS (http://www.xbow.com/) have 128 
Kbytes of flash memory that can be used for key storage. The 
flash memory capacity of TinyNode584 
(http://www.tinynode.com/) is 512 Kbytes. In our RGM 
scheme, the memory requirement for keys is less than 20 
Kbytes that comprises of a small portion of the flash memory 
of the sensor nodes.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we proposed a random key predistribution 
scheme, called RGM, for multi-phase wireless sensor 
networks. In our RGM scheme, each redeployed node comes 
with a refreshed set of generation keys so that capture of a 
node that belong to a particular generation has minimal effect 
on the keys between nodes of other generations. In this way, 
the value of the information learned by the attacker is reduced 
and, therefore, the resiliency of the network is improved. Our 
scheme also takes care of the cryptographic connectivity of the 
newly deployed nodes with their physical neighbors. The 
simulative performance analyses show that our scheme 
performs approx. 50% better active resiliency under heavy 
attacks as compared to well-known RoK scheme [1] with the 
cost of 10% degradation in cryptographic connectivity. Thus, 
our scheme provides a good tradeoff in favor of security. It is 
also worthwhile to mention that the connectivity value of 0.9 
does not make any node disconnected from the network. The 
network still operates securely with this rate.   
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